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RECENT DECISIONS

has the right to withhold. 16 Banking, however, is affected with a
public interest. 17 Thus, should not banks be limited in their ability
to exercise their right to withhold prepayment?
If the market value of mortgaged property rises during the
term of a mortgage the risk lessens and the mortgage, as a lien, becomes more valuable. Prepayment, then, deprives a bank of an
asset that has become more secure and therefore more valuable.
Conversely, prepayment when the property's value falls is more desirable for a bank but less likely to be requested by the mortgagor.
Why, then, should not a bank be permitted to bargain for its right
to retain the lien?
It has been the policy of certain federal and state enactments
to control the prepayment of mortgages by requiring the inclusion of
prepayment provisions in mortgages.' 8 Possibly, New York should
follow this trend as a matter of public protection. A proposed addition to the New York Real Property Law recently considered
in the State Senate' 9 would require the inclusion of a borrower's
prepayment option in all mortgages and extension agreements of
amounts less than fifteen thousand dollars. This option would be
exercisable at any time, but if exercised within eighteen months of
the execution of the mortgage, the debtor would forfeit ninety days
interest. This measure would protect small property owners who
frequently enter mortgage contracts without legal counsel. Creditors
holding the larger, more valuable liens would still have the right to
bargain for prepayment.

MORTGAGES-LIMITATIONS-CoNVEYANCE

SUBJECT TO A MORT-

GAGE WHICm HAS BECOME BA.um.-Prior to this litigation there

was a complicated series of transactions between plaintiff wife and
defendant husband. In 1929, the wife conveyed the property which
was the subject matter of this action to the husband who gave a bond
and purchase money mortgage for 10,000 dollars on the property.
In 1934, a short time after due date of the mortgage, the husband
reconveyed to his wife. The deed stated that the mortgage was not
16

See 5 WMIUsToN, ComRAcrs § 1601 et seq. (rev. ed. 1938).

17 Leary v. Capitol Trust Co. of Schenectady, N. Y., 238 App. Div. 661,

265 N. Y. Supp. 856 (3d Dep't 1933), aff'd, 263 N. Y. 640, 189 N. E. 735 (1934).
18 U. S. CODE, LAws OF THE 78TH CONGaESS, SECOND SEssioN 1944, c. 268,
p. 313 (Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944), permits the Veteran's Administrator to require "G.1." mortgages to contain prepayment provisions.
New York Banking Law, Section 393, requires that Savings and Loan Association mortgage loans shall be repayable upon forfeiture of ninety days' interest or one year's interest if the loan has not yet run for one year.
10 N. Y. State Assembly Introductory No. 16. Other compulsory prepayment bills are pending review in committee.
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to be merged in the title. In 1948, pursuant to a judgment of the
court, the wife reconveyed the premises to the husband. The conveyance recited that the property was "subject to the mortgage."
In 1949, the wife commenced an action to foreclose the 10,000 dollar
mortgage. In the lower court the wife's complaint was dismissed
on the merits on the ground that the statute of limitations barred
the enforcement.' Held, judgment reversed. Shohfi v. Shohfi, 277
App. Div. 390, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 497 (2d Dep't 1950).
The agreement that the mortgage should not be merged in the
fee, as between the parties constituted the mortgaged premises the
primary fund for the payment of the debt.2 When mortgaged premises are transferred or sold and the deed recites that the property is
conveyed "subject to the mortgage," the court held it constitutes a
written acknowledgment 3 of the mortgage debt and therefore the six
year limitation period 4 began to run again from the date of such recognition of the debt. This acknowledgment is also binding on the
grantee.5 Moreover, it is of no consequence that it is made by a
grantor who is not the mortgagor because the land is the primary fund
for the debt. 6 There being, however, no written acknowledgment by
the husband of the obligation on the bond the period of limitation is a
proper affirmative defense 7 in reference to his personal liability. In
a word the mortgage could be foreclosed and the property sold on

I Shohfi v. Shohfi, 124 N. Y. L. J. 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. July 3, 1950). See
also Shohfi v. Shohfi, 123 N. Y. L. J.634, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 1950),
wherein motion to dismiss complaint on ground of statute of limitations was
granted but with leave to plaintiff to plead anew.
2 The general rule is that, unless there is an express or implied intent to
the contrary, when a greater and lesser estate meet in the same person, without
any intermediate estate, the lesser estate is at once merged in the greater. A
merger ordinarily occurs when the fee and a charge or mortgage thereon vest
in the possession of one person. Eagan v. Engeman, 125 App. Div. 743, 110
N. Y. Supp. 366 (1st Dep't 1908); cf. Hubbell v. Blakeslee, 71 N. Y. 63
(1877); Central Hanover Bank v. Roslyn Estates, 266 App. Div. 244, 42
N. Y. S. 2d 130 (2d Dep't 1943). 2 JoNES, MORTGAGES §§ 1080, 1088, 1094
(8th ed. 1928); WiLTsiE, MORTGAGE FoRarosuRE § 265 (Eager ed. 1927);
RESTATEMENT, SEcuRTY § 83, comment c (1941); see Note, 95 A. L. R. 94
(1935).
3
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 59. "An acknowledgment . . . in a writing
signed by the party to be charged ... is ... competent evidence ... to take
a case out of the operation of the provisions of this article relating to the
limitation of time. . . ."; WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FOREcLosURE § 85 (Eager ed.
1927) ; Moore v. Clark, 40 N. J. Eq. 152 (1885).
4N. Y. Cry. PRAc. Acr § 47a. "1. An action . . . upon a mortgage of
real property . . . must be commenced within six years after the cause of
action has accrued."
52 JONES, MORTGAGES § 1539 (8th ed. 1928); WiLTsIE, MORTGAGE FoREcr:osuRE § 88 (Eager ed. 1927).
6Heyer v. Pruyn, 7 Paige Ch. 465 (N. Y. 1839); WILTSIE, MORTGAGE
FoREc.osuRE §§ 87, 88 (Eager ed. 1927) ; 2 JONES, MORTGAGES § 1487 (8th ed.
1928).
7 "The statute of limitations must be pleaded in order to secure the protection of it." 2 JONES, MORTGAGES § 1497 (8th ed. 1928).
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the foreclosure sale but no deficiency judgment could be obtained
against the husband.
For some time it has been the inclination of the legislature to
shorten the periods of limitation. 8 Formerly the foreclosure of a
mortgage on real estate was barred after twenty years.9 But recently
the legislature reduced the time to six years and now, if no interest
or amortization is paid on a past due mortgage for six years after
its maturity and no action is commenced to enforce collection within
that time, the mortgagee ordinarily' 0 loses all right to foreclose
for the principal of the mortgage debt. It is to be noted, however,
that although the mortgagee's right to foreclose for the principal
may be barred by the statute of limitations, he still may foreclose
for the installments of interest "1due for a period between two dates,
namely, from a date six years prior to the commencement of his
suit for interest down to the date at2 which the principal debt was
barred by the statute of limitations.1
When the statute of limitations on mortgages was twenty years
there were comparatively few cases in which owners claimed that
the mortgage had been outlawed. When the time was reduced to
six years it was only natural to anticipate that many more cases
would arise'in which it would be claimed that the right to foreclosure
has been lost; and the courts thus will have the occasion to consider
more often the means of waiving (as was done in the principal case)
and suspending the statute of limitations in an action for foreclosure.
Thus, it would be advantageous to reconsider the above-named
methods of overcoming the affirmative defense of the statute.
Waiver of the bar of the statute of limitations may be effected
by (1) a written promise to pay;' 3 or (2) a written acknowledg8 PRAsHKER, Nzw YORK PRACrICE 17 (1947).
"In 1936, . . . libel and
slander actions [were] reduced from two years to one year .... In the same

year, the period of limitation applicable to actions to recover damages for in-

jury to property was reduced from six years to three years .... In 1941,

the period of limitation applicable to instruments under seal was reduced from
twenty years to six years.. . ." Id. at n. 4. The legislature's "reluctance" to
increase the statute of limitations directly or indirectly is evidenced by their
refusal to amend the malpractice statute of limitations notwithstanding the
proposed amendment's beneficent features. See 1942 LEG. Doc. NO. 65(E),
135, 167, 1950 REPORT, N. Y. LAw RmiSON Co miSsioN.
9 Section 47a of the New York Civil Practice Act was added by the Laws
of N. Y. 1938, c. 499.
10 This qualification is hereinafter explained in the text.
31 A cause of action for interest may be the subject of a separate suit.

Kirschner v. Cohn, 270 App. Div. 126, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 561 (2d Dep't 1945);
Union Trust Co. v. Kaplan, 249 App. Div. 280, 292 N. Y. Supp. 152 (4th Dep't

1936).
12

Ernst v. Schaack, 271 App. Div. 1012, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 95 (2d Dep't),

aff'd iem., 297 N. Y. 566, 74 N. E. 2d 482 (1947); Kirschner v Cohn, 270
App. Div. 126, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 561 (2d Dep't 1945).

13 ,,... a debt barred... may be revived by a new promise..
such new
promise may be either an express or an implied promise. . . ." If the promise

is conditional the occurrence of the condition must be established.
MORTGAGE Foanciuosuam § 86 (Eager ed. 1927).
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ment of the debt; 14 or (3) part payment of the principal or interest. 15
A payment on a mortgage by a co-mortgagor, present owner of the
equity of redemption, although not a co-obligor on the bond is an
acknowledgment of the existence of the lien of the mortgage upon
the property.16 An agreement by the mortgagor to the appointment
of an agent to collect the rents from the premises and after payment
of ordinary operating expenses to1 remit to the arrears of interest
on the mortgage extends the time. 7
Tolling of the statute may be effected by (1) defendant's absence from the state when the cause of action accrued; or (2) defendant's departure from the state for four continuous months or
more subsequent to its accrual; or (3) defendant's residence in
the state under a false name unknown by the plaintiff.' 8 The limitation on the action to foreclose a mortgage was suspended as to the
defendant absent from the state even though the complaint did not
is also effected
seek a personal deficiency judgment. 19 Suspension
20
for the period of military service of the defendant.
It is important to note the effect of the decision in the principal
case. Since most deeds conveying mortgaged property include a
reference to the mortgage the parties will always extend the period
of limitation for six years from the date of conveyance of the mortgaged premises even though the original limitation of time is about
to be or is exhausted. Generally this consequence will be entirely
equitable and just.
Property conveyed "subject to a mortgage" usually means that
the charge of the mortgage is deducted from the purchase price and
the grantee thereby obtains the benefit of the mortgage. Consequently, he should not escape paying the mortgage debt merely because the former owner, the mortgagor, had failed to pay interest
or amortization for a number of years.

14 From an unqualified written acknowledgment of a debt an implied promise
to pay is established. If there are qualifications to the acknowledgment which
negate or repel an intention to pay, an implied promise will not be created.
39 (1947).
PRAsExER, NEw YORK= PRAcTic
35 "Part payment of a debt is not of itself conclusive to take the case out
of the statute. In order to have that effect it must not only appear that the
payment was made on account of a debt, but also on account of the debt for

which action is brought. .

.

. The payment must be made under such circum-

stances as to show a recognition of a larger debt remaining unpaid." Crow
v. Gleason, 141 N. Y. 489, 493, 36 N. E. 497, 500 (1894).
16 Although the defendant was not personally liable the land could be foreclosed. Gorgas v. Perito, 299 N. Y. 265, 86 N. E. 2d 742 (1949).
17 Haloke Realty Corp. v. Sininsky, 117 N. Y. L. J. 2423, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.
June 19, 1947).,
is N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 19.
19
Chapin v. Posner, 299 N. Y. 31, 85 N. E. 2d 172 (1949).
20
N. Y. STATE SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' Civim RELIEF AcT § 308. Cf. Travis
v. Lynch, 115 N. Y. L. J. 958, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. March 9, 1946).

